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Abstract 
 
The Radiation Tolerant Intelligent 
Memory Stack (RTIMS), suitable for 
both geostationary and low earth 
orbit missions, has been developed. 
The memory module is fully functional 
and undergoing environmental and 
radiation characterization. A self-
contained “flight-like” module is 
expected to be completed in 2006. 
 RTIMS provides reconfigurable 
circuitry and 2 gigabits of error 
corrected or 1 gigabit of triple 
redundant digital memory in a small 
package. RTIMS utilizes circuit 
stacking of heterogeneous components 
and radiation shielding technologies. 
A reprogrammable field programmable 
gate array (FPGA), six synchronous 
dynamic random access memories, 
linear regulator, and the radiation 
mitigation circuitries are stacked 
into a module of 42.7mm x 42.7mm x 
13.00mm.  
Triple module redundancy, current 
limiting, configuration scrubbing, 
and single event function interrupt 
detection are employed to mitigate 
radiation effects. The mitigation 
techniques significantly simplify 
system design. RTIMS is well suited 
for deployment in real-time data 
processing, reconfigurable computing, 
and memory intensive applications.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
NASA has identified many systems 
that will require on-board satellite 
data processing for future missions. 
Continuing themes for addressing 
these requirements include the need 
for ever-increasing resolution, 
improved data quality, and additional 
capacity for raw and/or processed 
data. The requirement to efficiently 
handle large data sets necessitates 
the use of larger on-board memories. 
This paper discusses the development 
of a radiation tolerant memory, 
suitable for both geo-stationary 
(GEO) and low earth orbit (LEO) 
missions.  
RTIMS has been designed, built, 
tested and integrated onto a 3U 
Compact PCI printed circuit board 
(PCB). RTIMS capitalizes on previous 
technology investments at NASA 
Langley Research Center (LaRC), NASA 
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), 
ASRC Aerospace, Irvine Sensors and 3D 
Plus USA. RTIMS incorporates the 
circuit stacking technology of 3D-
Plus USA, as well as package-level 
radiation shielding and novel 
radiation mitigation techniques 
developed at LaRC. By using 
reprogrammable FPGA technology for 
the memory controller, RTIMS can also 
be a key element in 
adaptive/reconfigurable computing 
applications. 
 
2. Need & Benefits 
 
The need for compact, high 
performance, radiation tolerant 
memories has been identified as 
critical to enabling our nation’s 
future space missions. Improved 
memory technologies offer reductions 
in size, cost, mass, power, risk and 
system complexity, and can be applied 
to advanced data processing, high 
bandwidth communication, and meeting 
the data volume needs of the next-
generation high-resolution sensors.  
Advances made by the RTIMS 
technology provide the following key 
benefits: 
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1. Significant reductions in the 
size and mass of mission memory 
arrays. 
2. A radiation tolerant memory 
suitable for both GEO and LEO space 
missions by using new package level 
radiation shielding technology and 
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) FPGA 
techniques. 
3. Simplified interface to a large 
SDRAM memory array with built-in 
logic for timing reads, writes and 
refresh cycles.  
4. Novel self scrubbing and Single 
Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) 
detection that allow a relatively 
“soft” FPGA to become radiation 
tolerant without external scrubbing 
and monitoring hardware. 
5. Efficient design, test, and 
validation by incorporating the 
radiation mitigation technology at 
the component level rather than 
requiring the designer to implement a 
design unique solution at the system 
level.  
6. Increased system reliability by 
distributing the radiation mitigation 
structure to each component instead 
of a single point failure at the 
system level. 
7. Added mission flexibility by 
operating the memory array in a TMR 
architecture with 1Gb of storage or 
in an EDAC (Error Detection And 
Correction) mode where part of the 
memory is used to detect and correct 
errors with 2Gb of storage (corrects 
single bit errors and detects double 
bit errors). This allows RTIMS to be 
used effectively on many types of 
missions because it can be configured 
for the “harshness” of the expected 
environment. 
8. Tightly integrated solution that 
includes a Field Programmable Gate 
Array (FPGA), six synchronous dynamic 
random access memories (SDRAMs), 
linear regulator, and the radiation 
mitigation circuitry into a single 
stack or component. 
9. In-flight reconfigurability 
using Static Random Access Memory 
(SRAM) based FPGA technology allows 
the design to overcome both hardware 
and software errors that may be 
detected after launch during mission 
operations. This reduces overall 
mission risk which is increasingly 
important as flight system 
development times and budgets 
decrease. It also allows RTIMS to 
adapt to changing mission conditions. 
10. Additional logic and processing 
resources. By reprogramming the FPGA 
a designer can take advantage of the 
“extra” elements in the FPGA to 
implement other portions of their 
design. 
These features provide considerable 
engineering savings as well as 
advanced functionality. RTIMS is 
enabling, because it allows 
standardized hardware to be used for 
completely different missions 
achieving lower costs since the same 
hardware design can be reused. 
 
3. RTIMS Module Construction 
 
The RTIMS module is a major step 
forward in the state of the art for 
space based memory arrays. A block 
diagram of RTIMS is shown in Figure 
1. The new stacking technology used 
for RTIMS allows a heterogeneous 
stack of electronic parts to be built 
into a single component. The 
electronic parts in the stack can be 
bare electronic die, packaged parts 
(plastic or ceramic), or chip 
passives (capacitors and resistors). 
This new stacking technology 
typically provides an 80% reduction 
in required volume or footprint for a 
given application. 
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 Figure 1. RTIMS Block Diagram 
 
NASA GSFC, in conjunction with 
Centre National d’Études Spatiales 
(CNES) and the European Space Agency 
(ESA), completed a study on this 
stacking technology from 3D Plus. The 
study determined that the stacking 
technology is rugged enough and 
suitable for space applications [1]. 
The mechanical development of a 3D 
module is very similar to that used 
for a standard Multi Chip Module 
(MCM). The main difference from an 
MCM is the splitting of the design 
function onto several layers. These 
layers are essentially individual 
circuit boards allowing the stacking 
of electronic components placed on 
them. Once each layer (circuit board) 
of the module is designed, the layers 
can be fabricated, populated with 
components, tested, and burned in, 
all before final module assembly. 
This reduces the impacts of 
manufacturing errors and faulty 
components. The layers are then 
stacked together, aligned, and 
vertically spaced. A very pure epoxy 
resin from Dexter (HYSOL FP4450) is 
used to fill the spaces around the 
entire module and between each layer. 
After resin polymerization, the 
module is cut from the mold, exposing 
the external connections (flying-
leads) that will be used to 
vertically interconnect the layers. 
Nickel is then chemically and 
electro-chemically deposited onto the 
module. This effectively shorts all 
of the flying leads together. A laser 
is then used to create grooves that 
leave the appropriate vertical 
connections. Finally, a mission 
specific thickness of Tantalum is 
installed for radiation shielding. 
The RTIMS module measures 42.7mm x 
42.7mm x 13.0mm as shown in Figure 3. 
 Figure 2. RTIMS Cross Section 
 
 Figure 3. RTIMS Dimensions 
 
The RTIMS module is designed with a 
144 pin quad flat pack footprint and 
three active layers of circuitry. A 
cross section of the RTIMS module 
(without tantalum shield installed) 
is shown in Figure 2. 
 
RTIMS also incorporates internal 
thermal drains and internal radiation 
shielding. A completed RTIMS module 
is shown in Figure 4. 
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 Figure 4. RTIMS Module 
 
4. Making the System Radiation 
Tolerant 
 
4.1. Robustness vs. Capacity 
 
A single event upset (SEU) may 
introduce one or more data bit errors 
in a SDRAM device. The RTIMS 
architecture provides the flexibility 
of organizing the six SDRAMs, each of 
1 Gb capacity, into a 128 MWord (2 
bytes per word) EDAC memory, or a 64 
MWord TMR memory. This can be easily 
accomplished if all of the signal 
pins of the SDRAMs are connected to 
the FPGA. However, the Xilinx device 
selected for this project, XQ2V1000 
in a BG575 package, does not have 
sufficient pins to support this 
solution. 
 
Figure 5. RTIMS FPGA SDRAMs Wiring 
 
Figure 5 shows the RTIMS wiring 
scheme between the FPGA and the 
SDRAMs. The Clk_TR0, Clk_TR1, Clk_TR2 
are copies of the SDRAM clock. 
When operating in TMR memory mode, 
the control buses, Add/Ctl_TR3, 
Add/Ctl_TR2, Add/Ctl_TR1, and 
Add/Ctl_TR0, have the same signaling. 
During write operation, DQ5, DQ4, DQ3 
are driven with the high order byte 
of the data word, and DQ2, DQ1, DQ0 
are driven with the low order byte. 
During read, DQ5, DQ4, and DQ3 are 
voted to generate the high order byte 
of the data word, and DQ2, DQ1, and 
DQ0 are voted to generate the low 
order byte. There is no single point 
failure in this configuration. 
When operating in EDAC memory mode, 
the SDRAMs are organized into two 
banks of 64 MWords each. Add/Ctl_TR3 
and Add/Ctl_TR1 buses have the same 
signaling and control one bank of 
memory. Add/Ctl_TR2 and Add/Ctl_TR0 
buses also have the same signaling 
and control the other bank. During 
write operations, either DQ5, DQ4, 
DQ2, or DQ3, DQ1, DQ0 are driven with 
the data word and the check bits. 
Similarly, during read operations, 
either DQ5, DQ4, DQ2, or DQ3, DQ1, 
DQ0 are selected for the data words 
and check bits. The control signals 
are single point failures. A SEU can 
induce multiple uncorrectable data 
bit errors. 
 
4.2. Single Point Failure 
 
The FPGA and the SDRAM are 
susceptible to SEU. The logic 
implemented in the FPGA utilizes the 
Xilinx TMR strategy, and the Xilinx 
TMRTOOL [2] is employed to triplicate 
the design. Due to the limited number 
of signal pins on the FPGA package, 
it is not possible to triplicate 
every i/o signal. The single pin i/o 
signals thus become single point 
failures. 
The DataIn and DataOut buses of the 
module interface signals are not 
triplicated. If this is shown to be 
problematic, an EDAC scheme can be 
implemented to protect these buses. 
The twelve spare i/o on the module 
can be utilized for this purpose. 
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The interface signals between the 
FPGA and the SDRAMs are not 
triplicated. An upset to anyone of 
the control signals may result in 
multiple bit data errors. This may 
occur when RTIMS is operating in EDAC 
memory mode, possibly resulting in 
unrecoverable errors. For the TMR 
memory mode, this would only affect 
one of the three redundant words and 
would therefore be corrected. 
An upset to one of the data signals 
may result in a single bit error. For 
the EDAC memory mode, this would 
result in a single bit error, but the 
data would be recovered (error 
corrected) via the EDAC circuit. For 
the TMR memory mode, it would only 
affect one bit of the three redundant 
words and would also be corrected.  
 
4.3. SEU 
 
The FPGA is susceptible to SEU. 
Xilinx XTMR scheme is employed to 
mitigate the problem. This scheme 
works based on the assumption that 
one SEU only induces one upset on a 
signal and its fan-outs. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that the upset is 
corrected before the next SEU. 
Current manufacturer test results 
indicate these assumptions are 
realistic. 
 
4.4. Dynamic State Recovery 
 
With redundancy, the circuit can 
function correctly with errors 
induced by one SEU. It is essential 
to correct the error states as 
quickly as possible, because the 
redundancy employed may not correct 
as errors accumulate. Xilinx XTMR 
scheme guarantees the correctness of 
the inputs of the flip-flop for a 
single error induced by a SEU. 
An upset flip-flop can be corrected 
only when it is reloaded with the 
corrected value. The flip-flop 
primitive in the FPGA has a Clock 
Enable (CE) pin that controls the 
loading of the flip-flop. Hence an 
upset flip-flop is corrected only 
after the CE pin is made active. To 
mitigate this the usage of flip-flops 
with rarely active CE pins is 
eliminated in the RTIMS design. 
 
4.5. Configuration Memory Refresh 
 
The FPGA is programmed to implement 
an application by setting the states 
of the configuration memory cells. 
The configuration memory cells are 
sensitive to SEU. It is essential to 
correct a configuration memory upset 
as quickly as possible, because the 
logic redundancy employed may not 
correct as errors accumulate. 
RTIMS utilizes a simple approach by 
refreshing the configuration memory 
cells at a regular interval that is 
selectable by the application. The 
default interval is 1 hour. The 
interval can be set to 10 minutes, 30 
minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, 24 hours, 
or off. 
The configuration bit stream is 
stored in the non-volatile radiation 
tolerant EEPROM. Upon power-on the 
FPGA loads its configuration from the 
EEPROM. It is the design objective to 
store one configuration bit stream 
that would work for both initial 
configuration and periodic 
configuration refreshing.  
Table 1 outlines the default 
configuration bitstream [3]. The 
default bitstream loads the entire 
FPGA with one command as indicated in 
step 2. This also overwrites the 
block ram. For configuration 
refreshing, the contents of the block 
ram are not overwritten, requiring 
instead a modified step 2. Steps 3 
and 4 are also skipped during 
configuration refreshing. 
Step Function
1 Set up
2 Write Configuration
3 Initialize registers, activate all interconnects
4 Start startup sequence
5 Check CRC, Desynch to desynchronizes the
configuration logic, 4 NOPS  Table 1. Default Bitsteam 
The modified configuration 
bitstream is shown in Table 2. During 
initial configuration loading, steps 
2A-2C are functionally equivalent to 
step 2 in the default bitstream.  
During configuration refresh, the 
content of the EEPROM is read 
sequentially, but steps 2C-5 are 
skipped by deasserting the CS signal 
on the FPGA. This effectively skips 
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the refreshing of the BRAM content, 
the initialization of registers, and 
the startup sequence. As steps are 
skipped, a revised CRC word is 
supplied. Step 5 is therefore also 
skipped. The revised CRC word is 
supplied in step 6. During initial 
configuration loading, though the CS 
signal is asserted, the Desynch 
command in step 5 signals the end of 
the configuration. 
 
Step Function
1 Set up
2A Write Configuration Stream to GCLK, IOB1, IOI1,
CLBs, IOI2, IOB2
2B Write Configuration Stream to BRAM INT
2C Write Configuration Stream to BRAM content AUTO
CRC
3 Initialize registers, activate all interconnects
4 Start startup sequence
5 Check CRC, Desynch to desynchronizes the
configuration logic, 4 NOPS
6 Check revised CRC, Desynch to desynchronizes the
configuration logic, 4 NOPS  Table 2. Modified Bitstream 
The configuration memory refresh 
controller can be implemented 
externally or internally. When it is 
implemented externally, it requires 
additional radiation tolerant 
devices. For this project, the 
configuration memory refresh 
controller is implemented in the FPGA 
that is internal to the RTIMS module. 
The internal controller does not 
increase the risk of failure as long 
as any SEU induced errors are 
corrected before the next SEU. 
 
4.6. Detection of Refresh Failure 
 
The configuration logic of the FPGA 
is hard-wired, and is not TMR 
protected. Though it has a small 
footprint, it has been shown to be 
susceptible to SEU. An upset here can 
only be corrected by a full 
initialization of the FPGA. 
Previous methods suggest that when 
certain configuration control 
register reads fail, this implies 
that the configuration logic is not 
functioning properly. This method is 
indirect and inefficient, requiring 
triplicated configuration data bus 
pins on the FPGA (since the 
configuration refresh controller is 
internal). An alternative efficient 
method for detecting configuration 
refresh failure is discussed next. 
During configuration refresh, all 
distributed memory that is 
implemented with look-up tables 
within the Configurable Logic Blocks 
are initialized. This process can be 
used to detect the failure of the 
configuration refresh. 
The configuration refresh control 
includes a 16x1 distributed memory. 
Just prior to configuration refresh, 
a known pattern is written into this 
memory. Configuration refresh, when 
successful, clears this memory to all 
zeros. Upon the completion of 
configuration refresh, this memory is 
read. Any non-zero content directly 
indicates the failure of 
configuration refresh. 
 
4.7. DCM Failure Recovery 
 
It has been shown that the 
functionality of the Digital Clock 
Manager (DCM) may not be recovered by 
configuration refresh alone. A reset 
to the failed DCM is required to 
recover its functionality. The 
approach to detecting and correcting 
this type of failure uses three 
counters. Each counter is clocked by 
one of the triplicate DCM clock 
outputs. The counters are started 
synchronously and, in normal 
operation, they will count in lock 
step. When one of the DCMs fail, the 
counter associated with this DCM will 
have a different count than the other 
two counters. Hence an error is 
detected and a reset to this DCM is 
generated. 
 Figure 6. DCM Checker 
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The DCM checker is shown in Figure 
6. The checker itself is triplicated. 
A router macro is inserted between 
the DCM clock outputs and the DCM 
checker. A DCM reset signal is 
generated when either the Reset_DCM 
voter fails, or the DCM clock output 
fails. 
 
4.8. SDRAM Scrubbing 
 
The SDRAMs are also susceptible to 
SEUs. It is essential to prevent the 
accumulation of errors induced by 
multiple SEUs. Otherwise the error 
correction circuitry may not be able 
to recover the data. 
RTIMS implements a scrubbing 
strategy where the contents of the 
SDRAMS are read sequentially at a 
fixed time interval. The interval is 
defaulted to one scrub every 30 us, 
on average. It takes approximately 32 
minutes to refresh the entire TMR 
configured SDRAM array, and 64 
minutes to refresh the entire EDAC 
configured SDRAM array. 
The scrubbing process consists of 
reading the SDRAM. When an error is 
detected and the error is 
correctable, the SDRAM is updated 
with the corrected data. 
Ideally the scrubbing is performed 
when the SDRAM is idling. Otherwise 
there will be contention between 
regular memory accesses and scrubbing 
memory accesses resulting in 
performance degradation. 
This strategy is flexible and 
allows minimal contention by taking 
advantage of the fact that the time 
interval between scrubs can vary as 
long as the average interval is 
maintained. When normal accesses are 
sparse, the SDRAM scrubber waits 
until at least 8 scrubs are pending. 
It will then do scrubbing accesses 
until the scrubbing is ahead by 8. 
When normal accesses are dense, the 
SDRAM scrubber contends with normal 
memory access requests, resulting in 
a maximum 0.2% degradation in 
throughput. 
 
5. Environmental Qualification 
 
The RTIMS modules are currently 
installed on a 3U Compact PCI memory 
board developed at LaRC. This board, 
in turn, will provide the structural 
support and electronics support 
during environmental testing for 
space qualification as dictated in 
MIL-STD-883 and MIL-STD-202. The 
RTIMS module was designed for a Total 
Ionizing Dose (TID) of 100Krad(Si) at 
25°C, latch up immunity to at least 
60MeV –cm²/mg at 25°C and an 
operating temperature of -40°C to 
+85°C. The types of environmental 
testing for RTIMS includes: thermal 
vacuum, vibration, accelerated life, 
and radiation. 
The radiation testing of the RTIMS 
module investigates the performance 
of the module in a radiation 
environment. During initial testing 
we will take the finished modules to 
a proton test facility to better 
understand the proton Single Event 
Effects (SEE) sensitivity. Follow on 
testing will include performing a 
radiation transport analysis using a 
typical geosynchronous radiation 
environment to understand the 
modules’ response to Total Ionizing 
Dose (TID).  
 
5.1 Proton Testing 
 
Piece-part heavy-ion SEE testing 
has been performed on all devices 
within the RTIMS module. This testing 
allowed for an analysis of 
destructive single event effects and 
individual component single event 
upsets and functional interrupts. 
But, system-level upset and 
functional interrupt events are 
possible that cannot be seen and the 
effectiveness of NASA LaRC’s 
radiation mitigation technology can 
not be verified by this type of 
testing. 
Ideally, a system is placed in a 
single-event-producing environment 
(similar to the mission) and 
monitored for these synergistic 
effects while studying mitigation 
effectiveness. The stacked nature of 
the module does not allow for ground-
based heavy ion sources to penetrate 
through the entire module structure 
and impact every device as would 
higher energy space radiation.  
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In these cases, high energy proton 
sources are used which penetrate the 
entire module structure. This allows 
verification of the entire module’s 
performance in a radiative 
environment. However, since proton-
induced SEEs require a nuclear 
interaction, the event rate is 
significantly reduced, requiring 
higher fluences to see effects and 
larger module sample sizes due to 
high doses from these higher 
fluences. 
 
5.2 Radiation Transport Analysis 
 
Every component within the RTIMS 
module was tested with Cobalt-60 for 
TID. A couple of the components 
showed sensitivity to TID, so 
additional shielding was placed in 
the package. To better understand how 
the RTIMS module will perform in a 
relevant space radiation environment, 
a radiation transport analysis will 
be done with the radiation transport 
code NOVICE which calculates expected 
dosage for each component within the 
RTIMS module. 
For this work, a GEO mission was 
selected. A year-long radiation 
environment will be calculated for 
two conditions – solar active and 
solar inactive (i.e., the radiation 
environment includes solar particle 
events for the solar active 
environment). These environments will 
be generated using the standard NASA 
GSFC space radiation environment 
models. 
Next, the geometry of the RTIMS 
module will be translated from the 
schematics and layouts of the RTIMS 
module into geometry coding that the 
radiation transport code (NOVICE) can 
understand. If the calculated doses 
are less than the sensitivities for 
all of the components then the RTIMS 
module should survive greater than 
100 Krads(Si) for a GEO mission (for 
solar active and inactive periods).  
 
6. Summary 
 
The objective of the RTIMS project 
is to develop and demonstrate an in-
flight reconfigurable radiation 
tolerant stacked memory array based 
on state-of-the-art chip stacking, 
radiation shielding and radiation 
mitigation technologies. Upon 
completion of the environmental 
testing this objective is expected to 
be met.  
RTIMS can be a complete computing 
module. Computing cores can be 
compiled into the on-board FPGA. The 
module can then support a 
distributed, reconfigurable computing 
architecture. 
RTIMS is also suitable for high 
reliability computing at nuclear 
facilities. Automated or remote 
controlled nuclear waste handlers 
often have significant computing 
and/or data collection tasks. RTIMS’ 
radiation tolerance makes it an 
excellent fit for these applications. 
The radiation tolerant RTIMS are 
also suitable for data collection 
and/or computing applications on 
nuclear powered craft (aircraft 
carriers, submarines, and future 
nuclear powered spacecraft). 
But, first and foremost, the RTIMS 
modules are designed for high 
performance space-based computing 
applications, including real-time 
data processing, reconfigurable 
computing, and memory intensive 
space-based systems. The RTIMS 
technology, which enables new 
measurements and information 
products, increases the accessibility 
and utility of data, and reduces the 
risk, cost, size, and development 
time of space-based systems. 
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